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What is the intentionality thesis actually about? Needless to say that 
the famous intentionality quote from Brentano’s Psychology from an 
Empirical Standpoint gave rise to many different glosses on how to 
understand what is meant there by intentionality. Since the 1950s, it 
has often been referred to as a theory about the irreducibility of the 
mental to the physical.1 This conception owes much to Chisholm’s 
interpretation of Brentano’s thesis in 1957, according to which the 
thesis could be expressed in terms of the irreducibility of intentional 
sentences in the context of psychological descriptions: 
We may … re-express Brentano’s thesis … by reference to intentional 
sentences. Let us say (1) that we do not need to use intentional sen-
tences when we describe nonpsychological phenomena…But (2) 
when we wish to describe perceiving, assuming, believing, knowing, 
wanting, hoping, and other such attitudes, then either (a) we must use 
sentences which are intentional or (b) we must use terms we do not 
need to use when we describe nonpsychological phenomena 
(Chisholm 1957, 172f.) 
Three years later, Quine reacted to Chisholm’s interpretation in a 
comment that would shape much of the further reception of the so-
called ‘Brentano thesis’, making it a thesis “of a piece with the thesis 
of indeterminacy of translation” (Quine 1960, 221) and more particu-
larly a thesis about the irreducibility of the mental to the physical and 
about the reality of the mental as well: 
1 A short survey of this kind of reading is proposed by Moran (1996, 1-2). 
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One may accept the Brentano thesis as either showing the indispensa-
bility of intentional idioms and the importance of an autonomous 
science of intention, or as showing the baselessness of intentional idi-
oms and the emptiness of a science of intention. My attitude, unlike 
Brentano’s, is the second. (Quine 1960, 221) 
According to Quine, Brentano was wrong to the extent that he ap-
pealed to the indispensability of intentional idioms to show the 
indispensability of mental objects and attitudes. To use intentional 
idioms in the Quinean way is simply to “postulate translation relations 
as somehow objectively valid though indeterminate in principle rela-
tive to the totality of speech dispositions” (ibid.).  
Quine’s reception of Brentano’s thesis and the conception of inten-
tionality that came with it had an important influence on Davidson, 
who took the indeterminacy of translation of intentional idioms as the 
basis for his anomalous monism.2 That things, actions or events are 
said to be intentional simply means that “we can describe [them] in a 
certain vocabulary – and the mark of that vocabulary is semantic 
intentionality” (Davidson 1987, 46). Chisholm’s direct and indirect 
influence on Quine and Davidson ultimately had the effect of quickly 
making Brentano’s thesis on the intentionality as the mark of the 
mental a thesis on the intentionality as the mark of some idioms or 
vocabulary about the mental – a thesis about intensionality. Although 
this interpretation has proven fruitful in discussions about physical-
ism, it remains questionable whether Brentano’s thesis on 
intentionality as the mark of the mental is really a thesis about the 
irreducibility of the mental to the physical, and more particularly, 
whether a reformulation of the intentionality thesis in terms of inten-
tional sentences is really appropriate. In the following paper, I will 
first discuss a presupposition in Chisholm’s understanding of inten-
tional sentences. This presupposition – namely, that intentional 
sentences are about intentional objects and that these objects possess a 
diminished form of existence – supports of course his reading of 
Brentano’s thesis, but there are good reasons, as I will try to show, to 
question this presupposition. As I will argue, Brentano was not in the 
first place arguing against reductionism, although he certainly would 
have disputed it: rather, he took the reality of the mental as it is given 
in experience, but wanted to identify a common ground shared by all 
2 See Davidson (1980, 149) for an explicit acknowledgment of this. 
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mental phenomena which would still take into account the intrinsic 
diversity of mental phenomena. In this respect, intentionality was 
introduced as a feature that comes in different varieties and that still 
provides a golden thread to the unity of sensations, presentations, 
judgments, strivings, willings, desirings, etc., which constitute every 
man’s mental life. 
My reading of the ‘Brentano thesis’ differs from Chisholm’s in that 
I take intentionality to be a generic feature that is displayed very dif-
ferently by different mental phenomena. In my view, it does not 
simply consist in a discriminatory feature which distinguishes the 
mental from the physical. Furthermore, I do not think that the inten-
tionality quote implies that the direction toward an object and the 
intentional containment of an object in an act amount to the same 
thing. Although these two predicates are rightly attributed to inten-
tional acts, they express different intentional properties, as I will try to 
show. My point here is based in part on Brentano’s own use of the 
terms ‘direction’ (Richtung) and ‘content’ (Inhalt), which supports the 
distinction suggested between the two predicates. I will leave here 
open the question as to whether Brentano really did have in mind the 
distinction that I am proposing. I only want to show that there are 
benefits to read Brentano with this distinction in mind. One of these 
benefits concerns the problematic issue of the intentionality of sensa-
tions. Already a few years after the publication of his Psychology from 
an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano’s thesis about the intentionality of 
sensations was rejected by some of his students, among them Stumpf 
and Husserl, for not being able to account for the distinction between 
sensory and non-sensory content. According to them, there is no in-
tentional object to be found in sensory contents. Chisholm (1989) also 
made a similar point, disputing the claim that Brentano attributed 
intentionality to sensations. Following Chisholm, Brentano rather 
wanted to say that truths about sense qualities are actually truths about 
the self or person which senses these qualities.3  
As I want to show, focusing on the distinction between direction 
and content as two distinct intentional properties allows us to answer 
some objections made by some of Brentano’s students, most notably 
Husserl and Stumpf, concerning the intentionality of sensations. Since 
there is also some textual evidence that show that Brentano had in 
mind different conditions (and not merely different descriptions of the 
3 Chisholm (1989, 5). 
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same condition), my current proposal can be seen as a defense of 
Brentano’s position against some of his students, and indirectly as a 
defense for the thesis of the intentionality of sensations. 
2 The Intentionality Quote 
Let us start with the Intentionality Quote, as it is the basis of the dis-
cussions which are of interest to us here:  
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of 
the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an 
object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, re-
lation to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be 
understood here as a reality), or immanent objectivity. Every mental 
phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they 
do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is present-
ed, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in 
hate hated, in desire desired and so on. (Brentano 1995, 68) 
Since Husserl, it has been customary to divide this quote into 3 differ-
ent theses4: 
(T1) Every mental phenomenon is characterized by the direction 
toward an object and its immanent objectivity.  
(T2) The object (of a mental phenomenon) is not a reality. 
(T3) Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within 
itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation 
something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, 
in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. 
Following this analysis, the Intentionality Quote would involve a 
psychological thesis (T1) on the nature of the intentional relation, 
coupled with an ontological thesis (T2) on the nature of the object of 
the intentional acts, supplemented with a thesis on the different ways 
these relations may occur through diverse intentional correlations: 
presenting/presented, judging/judged, etc. (T3). (T1) seems at least 
ambiguous since it expresses both the directionality of intentional acts 
and their property of containing something as object. Whether these 
two expressions are synonymous or simply correlative, is an issue I 
will later discuss, but (T1) as it stands clearly involves more than a 
4 See Husserl (1901, 366f.) and Smith & MacIntyre (1982, 48). 
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psychological thesis. (T2) is also problematic since it is a negative 
thesis. It does not tell us what the object of a mental phenomenon is, it 
simply tells us that it is not a reality. As for (T3), it might express two 
things: either it is simply a thesis about different modes under which 
one might be in relation to an intentional object, or it is a thesis about 
different intentional correlations (acts and their correlates), and in that 
sense (T3) – or at least the second part of it – would not necessarily 
concern intentional objects but simply intentional correlates. 
Taken together, (T1) and the first part of (T3) seem to express two 
criteria that are necessary in order for an act to be intentional: 
(C1): an act x is intentional iff x is a relation between a thinker and an 
intentional object 
(C2): an act x is intentional iff x contains something in itself as an 
object (i.e. contained object, or ‘content’). 
By symmetry and transitivity, this makes the right parts of (C1) and 
(C2) equivalent: x is a relation between a thinker and an intentional 
object iff x contains something in itself as an object. 
Are (C1) and (C2) simply equivalent propositions or are the terms 
‘intentional object’ and ‘content’ in (C1) and (C2) synonymous, mak-
ing the propositions intensionally equivalent? To my knowledge, there 
is no explicit acknowledgment of the intensional equivalence of (C1) 
and (C2) in Brentano’s writings, but this of course does not preclude 
the plausibility of the synonymy thesis. In my view, Chisholm’s read-
ing of Brentano’s thesis presupposes the synonymy thesis: the right 
parts of (C1) and (C2) are not only equivalent propositions given that, 
following his view, the terms ‘intentional object’ and ‘content’ in (C1) 
and (C2) are synonymous and (C1) and (C2) are intensionally equiva-
lent.5 In the first case, the alleged synonymy of ‘intentional object’ 
and ‘content’ in (C1) and (C2) is the presupposition for the thesis that 
the object of an intentional act is always a content, i.e. an immanent 
object. In the second case, the intensional equivalence of (C1) and 
(C2) leads to the thesis that ‘intentional relation’ and ‘intentional 
inclusion’ are synonymous expressions. I will later return to this spe-
cific consequence that results from the intensional equivalence of (C1) 
and (C2), but we can simply add here that the expression ‘content’ is 
5 Interestingly, we find in Dennett (1969, 21-22) an interpretation of (C2) in terms of 




used here to stress the containment expressed in (T3). Whether the 
content is the same thing as the intentional object is a question I will 
discuss later, but I am just presuming here that (T1) and (T3) are 
different theses.  
Chisholm’s interpretation of (C1) and (C2) as co-extensive is con-
firmed also by his interpretation of (T2). According to (T2), since the 
object of the mental phenomenon is not a reality, it should only enjoy 
a kind of diminished existence. This is the conclusion presented in 
Chisholm (1960) and (1967): 
 
Brentano’s use of the expression ‘intentional inexistence’ (he didn’t 
use the term ‘intentionality’) may also suggest an ontological or meta-
physical doctrine concerning the types of being or existence. Did he 
mean to say that, in order for us to direct our thoughts toward objects 
that do not exist, such objects must be available to us in at least some 
kind of ‘inexistence’? If he was inclined to accept any such realm of 
being in 1874, he explicitly rejected it in his later writings.6  
 
Intentional inexistence, the mode of being of immanent objects, is 
therefore seen as a 
 
Mode of being (intentional inexistence, immanent objectivity, or ex-
istence in the understanding) that is short of actuality but more than 
nothingness.7 
 
This characterization of intentionality was decisive for Chisholm’s 
formulation of the criteria by which sentences that are used intention-
ally are distinguished from sentences that are not. If the objects of all 
intentional acts enjoy a diminished form of existence in the mind, it is 
easy to see that intentional sentences, like  
 
Mary is thinking about a centaur 
 
are failing existential generalization. The quantified version of (a),  
 
∃x(x is a centaur & Mary is thinking about x)  
 
                                                            
6 Chisholm (1960, 4-5). See also Chisholm (1957, 169). 
7 Chisholm (1967, 201). 
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is simply false. It is also easy to see that sentences about intentional 
objects will not be immune to the failure of the substitution of co-
referring terms salva veritate. If Mary believes that Cicero was a great 
emperor but does not know that Tully is the same person as Cicero, 
her sentences about Cicero and Tully will be sentences about two 
different (immanent) objects. 
By stating both the synonymy of ‘object’ and ‘content’ and the in-
tensional equivalence of (C1) and (C2), Chisholm built an influential 
theory of intentionality and reference inspired by Brentano, thereby 
developing Brentano’s criterion for distinguishing between the mental 
and the physical – only mental acts have the property of being inten-
tional – into an argument against the reduction of mental properties to 
physical properties.  
But the interpretation of (T2), which is presupposed here, is more 
problematic and tends to conflate existence with reality, which Bren-
tano strictly separates. According to him, realities are individual 
substances. The reality of an individual substance obtains inde-
pendently of its existence: both chairs and centaurs are real since both 
are bodies, although only chairs exist. By saying that the object of a 
mental phenomenon should not be understood as a reality, Brentano is 
therefore not committed to the conclusion drawn by Chisholm that 
intentional objects enjoy a diminished form of existence. In my view, 
he simply means that the object of a mental phenomenon should not 
be understood as an individual substance, which amounts to say that 
the question of its existence or non-existence is irrelevant. In other 
words, the object of a mental phenomenon is a non-real entity; an 
entia rationis, or an irrealia as Brentano usually labels this kind of 
entity.8 If Chisholm’s reading of (T2) is unsatisfactory regarding what 
Brentano really intended with this thesis, then it is hard to see which 
role the synonymy thesis should play, if it does not fulfill anymore the 
role it was supposed to (namely to give the basis for Chisholm’s read-
ing of (T2)). 
3 Intentional object, content and thought-object 
As we noted in the last section, the synonymy of ‘intentional object’ 
(also called ‘immanent object’) and ‘content’ and the intensional 
8 I therefore disagree with Antonelli (2002, 22) who reads (T2) as affirming “that 
objects of thought can be not only concrete realities, ‘things’ in the strict sense of the 




equivalence of (C1) and (C2) advocated by Chisholm means that the 
object of an intentional act is always a content. According to 
Chisholm’s interpretation of Brentano, the immanent object then 
serves as a mediator to the external object, the object of the outside 
world, regardless of there being one. Beside their trivially distinct 
immanent objects, the presentation of a centaur and the presentation of 
a horse simply differ in respect to the highly probable absence of an 
external object in the first case. In that case, the act is directed towards 
something which is simply not there, but it has its direction thanks to 
the immanent object. Chisholm’s idea runs as follows:  
 
(1) an actual intentionally inexistent unicorn is produced when one 
thinks about a unicorn; (2) one’s thought, however, is not directed up-
on this actual intentionally inexistent unicorn; and yet (3) it is in virtue 
of the existence of the intentionally inexistent unicorn that one’s 
thought may be said to be directed upon a unicorn.9 
 
What is precisely the ontological nature of the intentional object in 
that case? As Sauer (2006, 7) remarked, there are two ways of inter-
preting the ontological nature of the intentional object following this 
reading of the Intentionality Quote, and more specifically of (T1), of 
the synonymy of ‘object’ and ‘content’ (or ‘thought-object’, as used 
by Sauer) and the intensional equivalence of (C1) and (C2): 
 
(T1a): When one thinks of a thing A that, if it exists spatio-temporally, 
is an entity independent of consciousness, then the intentional object 
is the modified mental counterpart of A, the entia rationis thought, 
that is the intentional correlate. 
 
(T1b): One and the same thing may exist in two different ways: as a 
simple object of thought or in spatio-temporal reality. Therefore, 
every object of thought exists in the first sense and some of them exist 
also in the second sense. 
 
According to Sauer (2006), the mistake of Chisholm (but also of 
Kraus and Smith)10 is to interpret (T1) with the presupposition that 
(T1a) and (T1b) are expressing the same thing and seeing the inten-
                                                            
9 Chisholm (1967a, 11). 
10 See Smith (1994, 41) and Kraus (1919, 26).  
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tional object as having “a diminished form of existence”. I agree with 
Sauer that Brentano’s formulation of (T1) does not imply this conclu-
sion. I also agree with him that Brentano never held neither (T1a) nor 
(T1b). This is basically the point of the remark made to his student 
Marty in a letter of 1905, where Brentano emphasizes that 
 
by an object of a presentation (Objekt der Vorstellung) I meant what it 
is that the presentation is about, whether or not there is anything out-
side the mind corresponding to the presentation. 
It has never been my view that the immanent object is identical with 
‘object of presentation’ (vorgestelltes Objekt). The presentation does 
not have a “presented thing” as object, it has ‘the thing’ as object. For 
example, the presentation of a horse does not have a ‘presented horse’ 
as object, it has ‘a horse’ as object (immanent object, i.e. the only one 
to be properly named object). 
However, this [immanent] object need not exist. The person thinking 
may have something as the object of his thought even though that 
thing does not exist. 
Of course it has long been customary to say that universals, qua uni-
versals, ‘exist in the mind’ and not in reality, and such like. But this is 
incorrect if what is thus called ‘immanent’ is taken to be the ‘contem-
plated horse’ (gedachtes Pferd) or ‘the universal as object of thought’ 
(gedachtes Universale).11 
 
Brentano’s own confusing terminology, even in this very important 
clarification, certainly played a role in the ‘absurdities’ attributed to 
him by some of his former students. Let us simplify this terminology a 
little. Following this remark, the so-called ‘object of presentation’ 
(also called ‘content’, ‘object of thought’, or simply ‘correlate’) is the 
(non-real) correlate of the (real) act and should not be confused with 
                                                            
11 Brentano (1930, 87-8). English translation (significantly modified) in Brentano 
(1966, 51). Interestingly, we find a very similar remark in an earlier unpublished letter 
of 1891 from Brentano to Marty, where Stumpf is accused of confusing the correlate 
with the intentional object: “I found out that [Stumpf] believed that ‘red’ and ‘pre-
sented red’, ‘man’ and ‘presented man’ are one and the same […]. I clarified the issue 
the best I could […] and proposed him to think once more about the arguments […]” 
(“Ich fand, dass [Stumpf] glaubte, ‘Rot’ und ‘vorgestelltes Rot’, ‘Mensch’ und 
‘vorgestellter Mensch’ seien eins und dasselbe. […] Ich legte ihm die Sache, so gut 
ich konnte, klar […] und bat ihn schließlich, für sich allein noch einmal die Argumen-
te zu überdenken”). This letter quite discredits Kraus’ (1930, 192) reading of the 1905 
letter, according to which Brentano conceived of the immanent object as a correlate, 




the ‘immanent object’. We will call the first simply ‘content’, and the 
second the ‘intentional object’ to avoid further confusions. For every 
act of presentation p, there is a content cp such that not only p and cp 
are interdependent, but also that being aware of p also means to be 
aware of cp, and the other way round as well. Presenting a horse or a 
unicorn does not make an ontological difference in that respect, since 
the correlation holds between the act and its correlate: the presented-
horse or the presented-unicorn. This correlate (or ‘content’) should be 
seen only as a modified distinctional part of the act of presenting a 
horse. It is not, according to Brentano in the Psychology, the primary 
object of the act, but belongs (as a modified distinctional part) to the 
secondary object of the act.12 The correlate as a modified distinctional 
part of the act is therefore distinct from the unmodified ‘immanent 
object’. These are two distinct kinds of entities, the first being non-
real and the second real, but this distinction does not imply a distinc-
tion with respect to different modes of existence.  
 
4 Centaur cases 
If Brentano does not defend (T1a) nor (T1b) he still has to provide an 
explanation for centaur cases: How can a judgment like the one voiced 
by “there are no centaurs” both be true and about centaurs? If the 
judgment is about centaurs, then these must have the same kind of 
existence than horses, tables and chairs. But then, negative existential 
judgments about horses, tables and chairs should be true as well. It 
seems that two other options are available: either such judgments are 
about intentional centaurs (with a diminished kind of existence), or 
they are not about centaurs at all. Contrarily to Chisholm, I do not 
think that they are about intentional centaurs. Or at least, I do not 
think that Brentano found much interest in such a solution.  
Many elements in Brentano’s writings confirm this attitude. He 
proposed in his career different strategies to address the centaur cases: 
in some writings, he suggested to regard negative existential judg-
ments as a rejection of some entia rationis (the presented-centaur) or 
as the rejection of negative states of affairs (the non-existence of the 
centaur).13 In 1911, a true negative existential judgment like the one 
                                                            
12 See for instance Brentano’s argument against the thesis that the concept of a tone is 
a relative concept, which provides sufficient support to this statement. See Brentano 
(1874/1995, 185/101). 
13 See Brentano (1930, 133) and Srednicki (1965, 79). 
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voiced by the assertion “there are no centaurs” is best rendered by the 
following assertion: “someone who judges that there are non-centaurs 
judges correctly”. The negative entities supposed here are then simply 
fictions, comparable to Aristotle’s strategy concerning the indefinite 
names (onoma aoriston).14 Brentano was not very clear about the right 
solution to adopt concerning negative existential judgments. In 1885, 
in a lecture on logic, he preferred to say that they simply do not have 
any object.15 If Brentano was never really satisfied with the solutions 
he developed concerning negative existential judgments, I believe that 
the way these judgments are treated remains an exceptional case in his 
theory, and not a paradigmatic case, as it is often considered to be and 
as it is treated as such by Chisholm.16  
If intentional inexistence is not a diminished kind of existence, 
then there is a distinction to be made between the being-object of 
intentional objects and their existence: the intentional object ‘is-an-
object’ independently of the acceptance or the denial of its existence.17 
The centaur cases and the specific treatment of judgments about their 
existence or non-existence are interesting cases from the perspective 
of the second issue, but they show no specific particularity when 
considered from the perspective of the first issue. A clear illustration 
of this is to be found in Brentano’s letter to John Stuart Mill of 1873, 
partly reproduced in the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint:  
 
The proposition, ‘A centaur is a poetic fiction,’ does not imply, as you 
rightly point out, that a centaur exists, rather it implies the opposite. 
But if it is true, it does imply that something else exists, namely a po-
                                                            
14 See Brentano (2008/1995, 417/231). Even if his conception would have allowed 
him to overcome this problem, Bolzano too left a place in his theory for purely nega-
tive presentations (rein verneinende Vorstellungen), a subcategory of objectless 
presentations expressed by indefinite terms (onoma aoriston). See Bolzano (1837, 
416f. and 421 (volume 1)); Bolzano (1837, 48 (volume 2)); Bolzano (1837, 220f. 
(volume 4)). 
15 See Brentano (EL81, 13550): “one has to distinguish 1) between the object of the 
presentation and the presentation […] and 2) between the object of the judgment and 
the judgment […] the formers are often missing (like in the case of the true negative 
judgment)” “([m]an muss unterscheiden 1) zw[ischen] dem Object d[er] Vorstell[un]g 
u[nd] der Vorstell[un]g […] 2) ebenso zw[ischen] d[em] Object d[es] Urtheils u[nd] 
dem Urtheil […] Die ersteren fehlen oft.([wie] beim wahren negativen Urtheil)”. 
16 For a different interpretation of Brentano’s theory of the contents of judgment, see 
Mayer-Hillebrand (1959, 320f.). 
17 I use the expression ‘to be-an-object’ in order to underline the fact that one cannot 




etic fiction… The truth of the proposition does not require that there 
be a [centaur], but it does require that there be something else. If there 
were not something which existed merely in one’s thought, the propo-
sition would not be true.18 
 
Just recall that for Mill, such propositions indicate that the copula ‘is’ 
does not always express existence, therefore distinguishing between 
two uses of the ‘is’, merely nominal in the case of centaurs and exis-
tential in the case of judgments about existing things. Brentano’s 
answer to Mill was an attempt to convince him that this distinction 
was unnecessary and that there is only the existential use of the copu-
la. In the centaur cases, it is simply that the predicate ‘is a poetic 
fiction’ does not function attributively, as predicates usually do, but in 
a modifying way, as predicates like ‘is dead’ or ‘is painted’ do. The 
modifying function of the predicate is such that it does not predicate 
the thing which the sentence seems to be about, but something else. In 
the centaur cases, Brentano tells us that such sentences acknowledge 
the existence of ‘something which existed merely in one’s thought, 
but not in reality’ (etwas, was bloß in der Einbildung, nicht aber in 
Wirklichkeit bestehe). It would of course be tempting to characterize 
this ‘existing merely in one’s thought’ as some kind of diminished 
existence, as Smith does and as the English translation suggests. 
However, this characterization goes completely against what Brentano 
aims at in his argument against Mill, since accepting two kinds of 
existence would still leave us with two uses of the copula. If Brenta-
no’s point against Mill is supposedly right, then one should avoid this 
characterization. 
Brentano’s point against Mill is not isolated from the way he re-
gards the centaur cases, as shown by his treatment of judgments like 
the one voiced by the assertion: ‘Jupiter is a non-Ens’.19 But the cen-
taur cases are more problematic when one considers them from the 
perspective of true negative existential judgments. Here, Brentano’s 
solutions are multiple and the issue is complicated.20 But we can sum 
it up the following way: in order for a judgment to be true, it has to be 
evident. Brentano accepts two kinds of evidence, what he calls axio-
matic evidence and the evidence of inner perception. It is on the basis 
                                                            
18 Brentano (1995, 70). 
19 Brentano (1995, 170). 
20 I discuss this issue in Fréchette (2011). 
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of the first kind of evidence that a judgment like “There is no A that is 
a non A” is true. The true judgment voiced by ‘lions exist’ is best 
formulated by ‘whoever judges that lions exists judges rightly (cor-
rectly)”. On the other hand, a true judgment like “centaurs do not 
exist” means that whoever judges that centaurs exist judges falsely 
(incorrectly)”. True negative existential judgments are true since they 
express the rejection of someone who judges so-and-so. Therefore, in 
the case of true negative existential judgments, Brentano is not de-
fending the thesis that we do reject the existence of centaurs: negative 
existential judgments are simply the rejection of the existence of 
something else. His way of dealing with judgments about centaurs 
shows that Brentano is not confusing existence with reality: centaurs 
are real, but rejecting their existence does not mean that one takes a 
stance (accepting or rejecting) on their existence. If he would defend a 
view as the one Chisholm attributes to him, he would have no need to 
propose this particular treatment of centaur cases.  
The so-called centaur cases and the treatment reserved to them by 
Brentano show that two issues should be distinguished when consider-
ing intentional objects: their being-object and their existence. Centaurs 
are intentional objects as are tables and chairs insofar as they are 
objects of a presentation, but presenting a centaur is by no means an 
indication of its existence. The problem of the existence of centaurs 
appears only from the point of view of judgments: an agent without 
any judicative abilities would simply not be able to deal with this 
problem, since the concept of existence, according to Brentano, only 
appears upon reflection on judgments.21  
Considering both the distinction between intentional object and con-
tent discussed in the previous section and the particular treatment of 
centaur cases offered by Brentano, we could summarize his view as 
follow: (a) there is a distinction between the act-correlate and the 
intentional object: the first is a distinctional modified part of the act 
and the second is a non-real (demodified) counterpart of the correlate; 
(b) That (C1) and (C2) are extensionally equivalent does not imply the 
synonymy of the terms ‘object’ and ‘thought-object’ (or ‘content’): 
(C1) is a thesis about the intentional object, while (C2) is a thesis 
about the correlate. These two ‘conditions’ are merely a description of 
what is involved in every intentional act, they are not intensionally 
equivalent; (c) the question about the existence or non-existence of 
                                                            




intentional objects is a question that arises on the level of judgments, 
not on the level of presentations. There is nothing structurally distinct 
between the presentation of a red patch and the presentation of a cen-
taur:22 both have intentional objects which are indistinguishable (from 
the point of view of the presenter) from the modified mental counter-
parts, or intentional correlates. From the point of view of the person 
who presents these objects (and only present them, without judging 
about them or evaluating them), the intentional correlates necessarily 
(and trivially) have the same ontological status, since the act of pre-
senting does not allow for modalities or qualities. The question of 
existence or non-existence cannot be raised from the standpoint of the 
presenter, and therefore the distinction between content and object 
cannot be made from that perspective. 
As to (T2), if we distinguish between existence and reality, (T2) 
cannot be seen, as Chisholm and Husserl suggested, as a thesis about 
the ontological status of the intentional object, but merely as a thesis 
about the intentional object as being an irrealia. This is basically what 
the negative formulation aims at. The following diagram illustrates 
our last remarks: 
 
   
 
 
According to our interpretation of the theory, for every act of presen-
tation, there is a correlate to the act and an intentional (or immanent) 
object. As we have already said, to be-an-object is not a diminished 
kind of existence: that intentional objects ‘are-objects’ makes them 
simply a kind of entity, an irrealia, distinct from the secondary object, 
                                                            
22 Husserl (1901/2001, 299/99) formulated the very same idea. 
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which is a realia. Brentano, at least before the reistic turn, recognized 
both realia and irrealia in the ontology of the act. This means that to 
present a centaur and to present a horse both involve the real corre-
lates and the intentional objects. But does this mean that centaurs and 
horses both exist under the same mode? If it were the case, Brentano 
would believe that judgments expressed by sentences like ‘there are 
no centaurs’ are true judgments. He could not have this belief if horses 
and centaurs would exist under the same mode. 
This is basically the line of reflection that supported much of the 
interpretations inspired by Chisholm and which argued for a second 
mode of existence for intentional objects. In my view, this move is 
unnecessary as shown by Brentano’s own conception of centaur cases. 
On the right side of the diagram, we find the external object, which is 
the cause of the intentional object. Conversely, the intentional object 
is a sign of the external object.But it should be stressed here that the 
external object is in no sense an element of the intentional relation. In 
sum, when I have presentation of some white unicorn, there is only 
one proper relative, the presenting; the object named by ‘the white 
unicorn’ is an improper relative of the presenting construed by de-
modification of the non-real correlate. However, this analysis is 
possible only at the judicative level. 
 
5 An objection 
One could naturally object to this reconstruction that having both a 
correlate and an intentional object seems to be overloading the theory: 
if the distinction between correlate and intentional object is only the 
result of our critique of the synonymy thesis, then we still must show 
why this distinction is important in Brentano’s theory. As we will see, 
this distinction becomes crucial when one takes into account the na-
ture of inner perception and the importance of other classes of acts 
like judgments and acts of will or desire.  
Brentano’s basic idea about inner perception is that our mental acts 
are both object-directed and self-directed (or ‘innerly perceived’). 
When I hear a tone, my act is directed upon the tone (the intentional 
object, which is the primary object), but it is also self-directed. The 
secondary object of my hearing is the hearing itself with its correlate. 
Since there is no unconscious consciousness according to Brentano, 




In his letter to Marty, he sketches an argument, which one can al-
ready find in the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, in order 
to show the importance of this distinction. We can reconstruct this 
argument in the following way: if the immanent object and the corre-
late were one and the same thing, the (primary) object of the hearing 
would be a heard tone, and therefore the concepts of tones, colours 
(but also every other concept of intentional object) would simply be 
relative concepts, whose parts are relative to what is seen, heard, 
imagined, etc. The detail of the argument ad absurdum runs as fol-
lows:23 
suppose the tone would be same as the heard tone; the heard tone 
would be the primary object of the act of hearing and a correlate as 
well; correlates being also part of the object of inner perception, the 
hearing of the tone would be (together with its correlate) the primary 
object of the hearing of the tone, and not its secondary object; there-
fore, we could not think anything at all except relations to ourselves 
and to our thoughts, and this is undoubtedly false.24  
This argument aims to show that one needs a distinction between 
the correlate and the intentional object if one is to defend the thesis 
that intentional objects are not merely relations to one’s own thoughts, 
i.e. if the intentional object is not merely a part of the act. In order to 
accept this argument, one must of course accept the thesis that inner 
perception accompanies every mental act. It is not the place here to 
evaluate if Brentano’s reasons to support this thesis are justified, but 
since it is quite obvious that he held this thesis his whole life, there is 
no point questioning it here.25 Moreover, since this argument involves 
inner perception, it shows quite well that the distinction between the 
correlate and the intentional object goes hand in hand with the ac-
knowledgment of the inner perceivability of mental acts. 
Up to now, what I wanted to stress is that there are good reasons to 
support the view that Brentano did not regard the expressions ‘con-
tent’ and ‘intentional object’ as synonymous. Since the ‘content’ (or 
correlate, to stick with our terminology) is no real part of the object 
                                                            
23 I take the formulation of the argument from Sauer (2006), who discusses two 
different versions of it. 
24 Brentano (2008/1995, 150/101). 
25 See the first section of Brentano (1995) on inner consciousness, which precisely 
argues extensively against unconscious consciousness. But see also his conception of 
superposed acts in Brentano (1995/1982). His Theory of Categories (Brentano 
1933/1981), written in the late period, also confirms this position. 
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(the ‘intentional object’ in our terminology) – it is a distinctional part 
of the intentional object in a modified sense – (C1) and (C2) as such 
just cannot be intensionally equivalent in a determinative (non-
modifying) sense. Therefore, it would make good sense to see (C1) 
and (C2) as expressing two different conditions. Two further consid-
erations should help to support this reading: first, Brentano’s thesis on 
the intentionality of sensations and the actual use of the expressions 
‘direction’ and ‘content’, which also seems to show that Brentano did 
not consider (C1) and (C2) as intensionally equivalent. 
6 Intentionality of sensations 
It has often been underlined that Brentano’s conception of intentional-
ity, which entails that pains, horses and unicorns are all intentional 
objects in the same sense, faces some difficulty when it comes to the 
object of sensations. One of Brentano’s first students, Carl Stumpf, 
made this point very early: he disagrees with Brentano’s theory which 
holds that what characterizes the sensing of pain is the intentional 
inexistence of its object. According to Stumpf, Brentano neglects the 
distinction between sensing (empfinden) and presenting (vorstellen).26 
According to him, there is a categorial distinction between these two 
classes (you can localize your pain, but you cannot localize your 
memory of it, for instance) that Brentano fails to underline. What 
unites these categories is not their intentional character, but their 
dependence upon sensory perception. According to Stumpf, intention-
ality is therefore a property of only some mental acts, namely of those 
which are based on some presenting.  
Husserl made a similar point a few years later. If we are to under-
stand intentionality as the direction toward an object, as Brentano 
suggested, we should first avoid the mistake of empiricism whereby 
the attributes of the sensations (the colour as seen, the tone as heard) 
are confused with the properties of objects. According to Husserl, 
Brentano’s theory makes this mistake and it is therefore not able to 
account for the difference between the fact that I see a painting by 
Yves Klein and that I perceive some unordered blue patches27. Hus-
serl’s response to Brentano’s account is to say that while I am directed 
toward the painting, I am merely experiencing the sensory contents. 
26 See for instance Stumpf (1916). 




My seeing a painting is intentional, but my experiencing a sensory 
content is not. 
What these objections have in common is that they show the diffi-
culty of attributing an intentional direction to sensations, a position 
that Brentano would be forced to admit if he holds that every mental 
act is intentional.28 But is this really his position? To my knowledge, 
he does not offer any specific argument for the directedness of sensa-
tions, although he offers many (indirect) arguments for the 
intentionality of sensations. Following his view, sensations have as a 
primary object a sense-quality and are their own secondary object. To 
see a blue patch is to have a localized sense-quality of blue as a prima-
ry object and to be conscious of seeing it. Sensory pleasure and 
displeasure are constituted slightly differently: feeling pain not only 
consists in having a localized sense-quality (and being conscious of 
it), it also means feeling some displeasure regarding this sensation. Or 
in other words, the feeling of pain has a sensation (or better: a sensing) 
as intentional object, while the sensation of pain itself has only a 
sense-quality as intentional object.29 Sensations (or sensings), being 
mental phenomena, are intentional as well.  
As we have said before, Brentano does not offer any specific ar-
gument for the intentional character of sensations other than their 
categorization as mental phenomena. Just as mental phenomena are 
fully intentional, so too are sensations. But it would be rather counter-
intuitive to say that they are directed toward something. Indeed, in the 
absence of an explicit argument for the directedness of sensings, it is 
reasonable to question the claim. If one claims the intensional equiva-
lence of (C1) and (C2), as Chisholm does and as Smith seems to do as 
well, one should be bound to say that assertions like: 
 





my sensing of an itch in my foot is directed toward a localized sense-
quality as intentional object 
 
                                                            
28 See in particular his criticism of Hamilton in Brentano (1995, 68f). 
29 See Brentano (1995, 164).  
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are intensionally equivalent. But I see a difficulty in this, since two 
meanings of ‘direction’ seem to be involved here: First, it seems odd, 
at least prima facie, to say that my toothache is about an object in the 
same sense as my wish to smoke a cigarette is about a cigarette, but 
according to their reading of Brentano’s thesis, they should say both 
of the toothache and the wish that they are about something. Accept-
ing the synonymy thesis leads to the consequence that there must be 
something that sensations are about. Second, the direction involved in 
(b) seems rather to be a direction toward a location, more specifically, 
a body part. In other words, it seems that the talk of directedness of 
sensations is based on a misunderstanding: it makes good sense to say 
that my sensing of an itch is directed toward my foot, but this sense of 
‘direction’ is certainly not the same as the directedness of my wish to 
smoke a cigarette. The directedness of sensings depends basically 
(and exclusively) on the location of the sense-quality in the body, 
whereas it seems that the directedness of my wish involves the kind of 
directedness discussed above. Therefore, it seems odd to take the term 
‘direction’ in (b) as meaning the same thing as ‘relation’ in (C1) or 
‘direction’ in (T1). 
While the synonymy thesis is bound to this reading of the inten-
tionality of sensations, Brentano himself – at least to my knowledge of 
his works – does not seem to hold the strong thesis that all intentional-
ity is directional. On the contrary, he accepts different classes of 
intentional attitudes (presentings, judgings, lovings and hatings), 
which gives a good indication in my view that he was not advocating 
for the thesis that intentionality only comes in one kind. If one accepts 
that different varieties of intentionality are referred to in the Intention-
ality Quote, then there are a few alternatives to the problem of the 
directedness of sensations and to the synonymy thesis: 
One could leave aside either one or the other condition of the syn-
onymy thesis: leaving out (C1) would mean that intentionality is 
directedness and only directedness. On the other hand, leaving out 
(C2) would lead to the view that in order for some mental act to be 
intentional, it needs to contain something as an object. Spelling out 
intentionality solely in terms of directedness30 makes it difficult to 
30 I take aboutness to be one form of directedness, but I do not take a stance here on 
the particular case of aboutness, but stick with directedness in general. The main 
reason is that aboutness is often understood in terms of semantic content, while 




give an account of the intentionality of sensations. Therefore, it is no 
surprise to see Husserl develop such an account and rejecting the 
intentionality of sensations.31 On the other hand, spelling out inten-
tionality solely in terms of some kind of containment of an object in a 
subject gives an interesting model of the intentionality of sensations, 
which is close not only to much of what Brentano has written, but also 
to his main source of influence: Aristotle.32 But it certainly is a remote 
sense of intentionality that barely copes with the originality of the 
concept developed by Brentano. 
Two more nuanced options seem interesting here: the first is de-
veloped by Tim Crane under the label of ‘weak intentionalism’. 
According to Crane, all mental states are intentional and directed 
toward an object. The problematic case of bodily sensations is then 
just slightly different than beliefs, but structurally similar to them: in 
the sensation, something is sensed namely the body.33 In other words, 
the sensation is directed toward the part of the body where this sensa-
tion is felt. The idea behind this thesis is that bodily awareness (being 
aware of one’s own pain sensation, for instance) is a kind of perceptu-
al experience. Since perception is intentional, so too are sensations. Or 
to put it in Martin’s words: “in having bodily sensations, it appears to 
one as if whatever one is aware of through having such sensation is a 
part of one’s body”.34 
In the context of Brentano’s theory, I see two difficulties with this 
account: first, we are still left with the problem of using the term 
‘direction’ both in the sense of a location and in a non-locational 
sense. The second difficulty is the absence, in Crane’s account, of an 
epistemological distinction between inner and outer perception. He 
argues that mental phenomena are intentional but refuses the distinc-
tion between inner and outer perception. This appears most clearly in 
his treatment of bodily sensations: for him, bodily sensations are a 
                                                                                                                                
that sense. This was the dominant view in the philosophy of mind of the 1980s. See 
for instance the first sentence of Dennett and Haugeland (1987), but more generally 
McGinn (1982), Searle (1983) and Dennett (1989).  
31 Husserl (1901).  
32 The main source of influence is Aristotle, De Anima, 2.11, 423a27-424b10. Brenta-
no (1867, 79f.) interprets Aristotle’s view that the senses receive the form without its 
matter as meaning that the objects of sense perception are objectively (objectiv) 
contained in the agent. 
33 See Crane (1998). 
34 Martin (1995, 269). 
Brentano’s Thesis (Revisited) 
 
111 
form of awareness (of one’s own body). This is because attending to a 
sensation of pain in my ankle for instance is necessarily dependent on 
focusing on (or an awareness of) my ankle as a part of my body: in 
Brentanian wording, in order for me to have an inner perception of my 
sensing, I must first have an outer perception of the location of the 
sense-quality which would be an awareness of the part of the per-
ceived world but which would have the same epistemic value as inner 
perception. While I find this treatment of bodily sensations attractive 
in itself, it would hardly be an attractive option for Brentano, since the 
epistemic superiority of inner perception is left aside. According to 
Brentano, felt location belongs to outer perception: it would be a 
contradiction for him to attribute to it a kind of awareness which is 
exclusive to inner perception.35 This epistemic superiority being one 
of the core distinctive features of mental phenomena, along with 
intentionality, another solution should be found in order to reassess 
the intentionality of sensations from a Brentanian standpoint. 
The alternative I am proposing here is (again) to reject the synon-
ymy thesis: more specifically in the case of sensations, it would mean 
to reject the directionality of sensations while still maintaining the 
distinction between inner and outer perception and the classification 
of acts. But it would also mean to add a specification regarding pre-
sentings and sensings which might not be explicitly formulated in 
Brentano’s writings, but which would be perfectly compatible with 
the spirit of his ideas. 
Why reject the directionality of sensations? It might help to under-
line that the concept of direction implies the concept of an alternative 
(or at least an opposite) direction. I can love or hate expensive bottles 
of wine, I can accept or reject that it is raining, but there is no ‘oppo-
site direction’ when it comes to presenting or sensing. It would 
                                                            
35 Brentano has only one concept of awareness which he refers to as ‘inner conscious-
ness’ or ‘inner perception’. It is quite probable that he would have rejected the idea of 
bodily awareness put forward by Crane, since he rejected a very similar idea by Lotze 
(see Brentano’s critique of Lotze in Brentano 1995, p. 192f.). In a nutshell, Lotze’s 
theory of local signs provides an account of our qualitative perception of spatially 
extended sensations in which the distinction between feelings and sensations plays a 
crucial role: bodily feelings enjoy a relative independence from sensations which 
allows the formers to account for the subjectivity of our experience by letting sensa-
tions out of the explanation. For Brentano, localization results exclusively from 
sensations and there is no other epistemic access to it other than inner perception (of 
sensings). 
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certainly make sense for Brentano to say that my sensing of pain in 
my foot is directed to this one part of my body, but not because all 
mental states are directed towards perceived parts of the world 
(Crane): only to the extent, and quite indirectly, that I am accepting 
(and not rejecting) that my foot hurts. Taking my sensing of pain in 
isolation, or taking my presentation of a red patch, or even of a cen-
taur, in isolation, does not give me any alternative direction. 
Following this idea, to sense a pain in my foot and to love expen-
sive bottles of wine are both intentional acts, but they are intentional 
on a very different basis: what they have in common from a descrip-
tive standpoint is that their object is contained in themselves, but only 
my loving of expensive bottles of wine has a direction. 
The obvious objection here is to say that this account would still be 
a departure from Brentano’s theory, since according to him, the non-
synonymy of ‘content’ and ‘intentional object’ applies to all acts, from 
sensings to wishings. So a distinction between the direction of the 
pain and the correlate of the act of feeling pain would be required.  
To answer this objection I will just recall that the argument sup-
porting the distinction between ‘content’ and ‘intentional object’ is an 
argument based on inner perception. Perception, and therefore inner 
perception, is a judgment. So in order to distinguish between the 
content (the correlate) and the intentional object, a judgment is need-
ed. In other words, there is no descriptive distinction between the 
content and the intentional object in an isolated presenting without 
inner perception. It is through inner perception that I make this dis-
tinction. But inner perception involves a judgment.  
7 Direction and content 
My proposal is certainly unorthodox, but it is not so far-fetched when 
one considers Brentano’s use of the terms ‘direction’ (Richtung) and 
‘content’ (Inhalt) in his Psychology. While ‘content’ is mostly, but not 
exclusively, used for contexts concerning sensory contents, the term 
‘direction’ (Richtung) seems to appear almost exclusively in contexts 
of mental acts of higher order, like judgments and acts of love and 
hate.  
The occurrences of Richtung and gerichtet sein in the Psychology 
are not so numerous and are easy to list: 
– the ‘direction of the will’ in Aristotle’s De Anima, the directions of
feelings and desires (Gefühlsrichtungen) (2008, 21, 69, 268);
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– the direction towards an object (Richtung auf ein Object) (2008,
106);
– the direction (of inner consciousness) towards our own mental activ-
ities (Brentano 2008, 118);
– the direction of the act of sensation towards the physical phenome-
na, which is its primary object (Brentano 2008, 164).36
– the direction of two mental activities toward the same primary ob-
ject, like seeing and hearing or presenting and desiring. (Brentano
2008, 177; 182);
– the direction of striving (Streben) (Brentano 2008, 198);
– the direction of desire and love toward an object (Brentano 2008,
223; 278);
– the direction of acceptance and rejection towards a presented object
(Brentano 2008, 243); acceptance and rejection are modalities of the
direction (Brentano 2008, 269);
– the direction of will and affection (Brentano 2008, 258);
– the direction of the presentation of inner consciousness (Brentano
2008, 286).37
In sum, there seems to be textual evidence for the individual and 
separate treatment of the predicates ‘…is directed toward_’ and 
‘…contains _ as object’. Besides, it is worth noting that Brentano 
never uses the expression ‘Richtung auf einen Inhalt’ nor ‘gerichtet 
sein auf einen Inhalt’ (to be directed toward a content). The fact that a 
mental activity contains an object is at least partly different from the 
fact that a mental activity is directed towards an object, although in 
some cases they might be indistinguishable. I think that this is the case 
with the class of presentations (including sensings): there is a sense of 
speaking of the direction of a presentation, but only to the extent that 
this presentation is taken as a part of a larger whole which includes a 
judgment. When taken in isolation, presentations just do not seem to 
show any direction. This would also explain in part the confusion 
between the correlate of the act and the intentional object, since on the 
level of presentations, the distinction between both of them simply do 
36 This is the only use of ‘direction’ in relation with sensations. 
37 There are also three other indirect uses of the term ‘direction’ in the Psychology: a) 
there is no unconscious will that would be directed toward bodily movements (Bren-
tano 2008, 133); b) the falsity of Mill’s and Bain’s view according to which the 
hearing is directed toward itself as object and identical with the heard (pp. 140, 141, 
147); c) Brentano’s criticism of the view that inner perception has the same direction 




not appear to be evident. In brief, what I propose here are two things: 
1) as for the distinction between (C1) and (C2), taken as a distinction 
between kinds of intentionality, it only appears when one takes mental 
acts as a whole and not in isolation. An isolated description of the 
presentation act does not give us the distinction between the correlate 
and the intentional object. From the standpoint of the isolated descrip-
tion, to say that a presentation is directed towards an object 
(intentional object) or that it contains something within itself as ob-
jects (correlate, content) just seems to amount to the same thing.  
 
8 Final remarks 
In short, the idea that I am proposing here is to distinguish between 
two kinds of intentional properties. I do not claim that this was exactly 
what Brentano had in mind in his Psychology, especially regarding 
sensations. It is more of an alternative view that, I think, is able to 
preserve important insights from Brentano’s Psychology while provid-
ing an answer to the objections made to him by his students, most 
notably by Stumpf and Husserl, regarding the intentionality of the 
sensations. My main target was the synonymy thesis, namely the 
thesis according to which ‘direction’ and ‘inclusion’ are two synony-
mous terms that express one and the same characteristic of intentional 
acts. While many commentators of Brentano, among them Chisholm 
and Smith, tend to understand Brentano’s thesis as implying the syn-
onymy, I showed that there are good reasons to question the 
synonymy claim. First, it presupposes that the expressions ‘intentional 
object’ and ‘content’ are synonymous as well. As I have tried to show, 
there are good reasons to believe that Brentano was against the synon-
ymy of these two expressions, not only because there is written 
evidence that indicates this, but also because Brentano needs the 
distinction between non-real correlates of acts (what I called ‘con-
tents’) and intentional objects, many of which are real (tables, chairs, 
centaurs, etc.).  
Second, I suggested that there is no textual evidence that should 
lead us to regard Brentano’s treatment of centaur cases as paradigmat-
ic cases for his conception of intentionality. By stating that the 
intentional containment of an object in an act is the same thing as the 
intentional relation between a thinker and an intentional object, pro-
ponents of the synonymy thesis are led to see (T3) as a mere 
specification of (T1), thereby refusing the distinction between inten-
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tional object and content (or ‘correlate’). Therefore, centaurs, like any 
other intentional object, must combine the two following (often) in-
compatible properties: 
 
being the non-real correlate of an act  
being a real object 
 
Their way of avoiding the incompatibility is to understand (i) in the 
sense of a diminished kind of existence: according to this reading, (i) 
centaurs have a diminished kind of existence and (ii) they are real. 
Therefore, in their view, Brentano would solve Russell’s third puzzle 
by saying that it is not self-contradictory to deny the existence of 
centaurs since in that case, is not a non-entity which is the subject of 
the proposition ‘The centaur Chiron does not exist’ but a ‘diminished 
entity’, an intentional object with a diminished kind of existence. This 
reading is misleading, as I stressed: the different solutions proposed 
by Brentano to the treatment of centaur cases shows on the contrary 
that he never actually found a satisfactory solution for the treatment of 
true negative existential judgments. Moreover, most of his solutions 
try precisely to avoid positing intentionally existing centaurs as the 
basis of the true negative existential judgment. And when they do 
posit such entities, there is no indication in the respective writings that 
this treatment should be generalized to all intentional objects. My 
proposal, with respect to that case, was to distinguish between the 
being-object of centaurs and the denial of their existence: I might be 
presenting a centaur without taking a stance on its existence or non-
existence. In that case, the fact that my presentation has an intentional 
object has no existential significance. The question of existence only 
comes into question with higher-order cognitive and affective acts like 
judgings, wishings, etc. Therefore, not only should one limit the ex-
tension of the problem of the existence of intentional objects to the 
realm of judgings and affective acts: Brentano’s treatment of centaur 
cases, understood in this way, shows that he accepts, on the level of 
presentations, that there is always both a correlate and an intentional 
object, but on the level of judgings, he refuses most of the time to use 
these intentional objects in order to solve Russell’s third puzzle. I 
proposed to regard Brentano’s different suggestions (put forth 
throughout his career) for the treatment of centaur cases as different 




‘diminished form of existence’ (Smith), his point against Mill being 
precisely to avoid two different meanings of the copula. Rather, what 
his treatment of centaur cases shows is that Brentano remained true 
most of his life to the distinction between existence and reality: that 
centaurs are real does not imply that they exist. By rejecting (rightly) 
the existence of centaurs, I am not implicitly introducing their exist-
ence which I then reject: the concept of existence appears to him only 
at a higher level of mental acts, namely judgments: as I have stressed, 
a Brentanian agent without judicative ability would not be able to 
discriminate between centaurs and chairs regarding the issue of their 
existence. Therefore, Brentano’s actual treatment of centaur cases 
may be seen according to a certain view as an indication of the synon-
ymy thesis, but there is as much evidence that the centaur cases 
suggest precisely his stance against the synonymy thesis.  
Third, I then added a further consideration directed against the 
synonymy thesis: I presented a further objection to the distinction 
between correlate and intentional object, based on Brentano’s account 
of inner perception. If the correlate and the intentional object were one 
and the same (and if we accept that every mental act is an object of 
inner perception), the distinction between the primary (the sensed 
blue) and the secondary object (my sensing of the blue together with 
its correlate) would disappear. Inner perception being a core feature of 
all mental phenomena, it is better to stick with it. 
Fourth, I addressed a problematic issue for the proponents of the 
synonymy thesis: the intentionality of sensations. If one is to accept 
the synonymy thesis, one has to admit that sensations have a direction 
in the same sense than that of higher-level mental acts. I suggested 
that this was counter-intuitive, thereby providing another reason to go 
against the synonymy thesis without leaving completely the spirit of 
Brentano’s thesis. The solution was, here again, to see the two fea-
tures of ‘intentional direction’ and ‘intentional inclusion’ as two 
distinct features which are not always both discerned in every mental 
act: sensations include an intentional object, but it is impossible from 
the point of view of the sensing agent to discriminate between the 
intentional object (what it is directed toward) and the correlate (what it 
contains). 
What are the benefits of revisiting Brentano’s thesis in the way that 
I have proposed? First, it allows for a reading of Brentano’s oeuvre 
which is not fully determined by his change of mind, which occurred 
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around 1900, concerning the possibility of presenting (and judging 
about, wishing, etc.) intentional objects which are not real. According 
to my reading, core features of the intentionality thesis like (C1) and 
(C2) do not have a reistic import as they do according to Chisholm. It 
allows therefore for some continuity in Brentano’s understanding of 
intentionality. Second, it defuses somewhat the objections made by 
Husserl and Stumpf concerning the intentionality of sensations, there-
by offering an alternative view which complies with Brentano’s thesis 
on the intentionality of sensations. Third, it readjusts somewhat the 
focus of the Brentano’s thesis: admittedly, intentionality has much to 
do with intensionality, but it would be a mistake to assess Brentano’s 
thesis from the point of view of semantics. Reassessing the intention-
ality of sensations in a way which does not refer to a semantic 
approach (like Chisholm 1989) certainly is closer to Brentano’s spirit. 
Fourth, I think that distinguishing direction from content gives a more 
contrasted account of what was meant in the intentionality quote, 
showing that there was more to Brentano’s concerns than simply 
providing an account of semantic content and a theory of reference, as 
it is often considered to be the case since Chisholm. Lastly, I think 
that the account proposed here is less restrictive from a hermeneutical 
standpoint, since it takes into account the different theses held by 
Brentano. Whether this really reflects Brentano’s account is another 
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